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Abstract:  
 
Diversification as an underlying factor of financial constraints can create several costs. 
Diversified firms have the tendency to over-invest in lines of business which display poor 
investment opportunities.  
 
Diversification indeed reduces value. This loss in value is found mainly for firms of all sizes 
having managers with a higher level of optimism.  
 
The link between optimism and corporate investment is more pronounced in financially 
constraint firms. When the wedge between the internal and external cost of funds increases, a 
firm is more financially constrained.  
 
Analysing a sample of listed companies in Greece it is found that the higher the managerial 
optimism, the lower the excess value of a firm. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Managers, as a part of this world have the mandatory necessity to be optimistic and 
to enclose optimism in every step of their career, even though frequently this bias 
can lead them to unfavourable outcomes (Heaton, 2002). Recently, economists have 
increasingly implemented psychology to their research. One of the most frequently 
used personal characteristics of human behaviour is the presence of optimism and 
overconfidence in corporate investment decision making. According to Langer and 
Roth (1975), Miller and Ross (1975) and Nisbett and Ross (1980) individuals tend to 
account their success basically on their own personal abilities and characteristics due 
to the presence of optimism, whilst success mainly is in fact accounted due to 
random events.  
 
There have been several attempts to highlight the effect and impact of managerial 
hubris (Roll, 1986) and the phenomenon of optimism on corporate decision making. 
The effect on financing conditions on corporate behaviour has gathered a lot of 
attention in finance literature. Myers and Majluf (1984) display that when internal 
sources of finance are not enough for firms, they may reject valuable investment 
opportunities. Firms in the real world make investments based not only on the 
profitability of investment projects, but on the availability and costs of external 
financing. This theory that is opposed to the traditional theory of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) who state that in a perfect market environment the investment decision 
making within a firm is only affected by the expected return and profitability of the 
investment, is thoroughly investigated in this study due to its implications on 
corporate investment decision making, this study’s key field of analysis.  
 
The presence of financing constraints is justified by the existence of the higher 
sensitivity of investment of firms to internal sources of financing (Fazzari et al., 
1988; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Beck et al., 2006). The literature focusing on 
financing constraints is basically grounded on the different measures of investment-
cash flow sensitivity which is generally assumed to demonstrate financing 
constraints. The sensitivity, therefore, should display the degree to which a firm is 
relying on its internal funds in order to finance its investment projects.  
 
However, following the adverse results of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), several 
studies review the investment-cash flow sensitivity test. The basic argument of their 
critiques is that higher investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be justified by higher 
financing constraints due to the presence of non-monotonicity of investment-cash 
flow sensitivity. Financially successful firms too, may display high investment-cash 
flow sensitivity because they are systematically relying on internal sources of 
financing. Additionally, Ericson and Whited (2000), Alti (2003), and Bond et al. 
(2004) also argue that the cash flow contains already information regarding the 
firm’s investment opportunities. Thus, the importance of the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity can provide additional information on the expected performance and 
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profitability of a firm, instead of providing information on the strictness of financing 
constraints. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
2.1 Diversification and firm value 
 
Berger and Ofek (1995) examine the diversification effect on firm value. Theoretical 
arguments recommend that diversification can result in either value enhancing or 
value destroying effects. Greater operating efficiency, greater debt capacity, and 
lower taxes may be some possible benefits when a firm operates in different lines of 
business. On the contrary, the use of increased discretionary resources in order to 
undertake value decreasing investments, and the phenomenon of cross subsidies 
which allow low performing segments to use resources of the high performing 
segments are some of the possible disadvantages of diversification. Therefore, they 
support the idea that there is no clear image regarding the positive and negative 
effects of diversification on firm value.  
 
They use segment-level data in order to focus on the effect of diversification on firm 
value and to determine the possible sources of value gains or losses. The comparison 
of the imputed values of the segments of multi segment companies to the actual 
value of them leads them to the observation that diversified firms have values below 
the sum of the imputed values of their segments. The loss in value is, yet, 
significantly less for related diversifications.  
 
Consistent with diversification activity is Berger and Ofek’s (1995) theoretical 
justification developed during the late 1960s regarding the benefits of 
diversification. Evidently this trend has changed in the recent years. More recent 
theoretical arguments tend to support the costs of diversification. Chandler (1977) 
states that because multi segment firms create a pattern of specialised management, 
they are subsequently more efficient and, therefore, more profitable than focused 
firms. Weston (1970) suggests that liquidity allocation is more effective and more 
profitable for internal capital markets.  
 
Berger and Ofek (1995) study the effects of diversification on firm value with the 
use of the measurement of each segment’s value separately. As a result, they find 
that diversification indeed reduces value. This loss in value is found mainly for firms 
of all sizes, while it is reduced when the diversification is regarding related 
industries. They also find additional support regarding the fact that diversification 
reduces value because separate segments of diversified firms tend to display lower 
profitability than focused firms (Tachmatzidi, 2017; 2018). 
 
An additional possible benefit of diversification stems from the combination of 
businesses with imperfectly correlated earnings. This effect has as a result 
diversified firms to gain higher debt capacity compared to focused firms of similar 
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size (Lewellen, 1971). Increased debt capacity can create value by increasing interest 
tax shields. Therefore, diversified firms are supposed to have lower taxes and higher 
leverage. According to Majd and Myers (1987) focused firms face an important tax 
disadvantage because tax is attributed to the government in case of positive income; 
on the contrary in case of negative income the government is not obligated to 
attribute the difference to the firm. However, Majd and Myers (1987) predict that 
when one or more segments of a diversified firm face losses in some years, the firm 
should pay less in taxes compared to the taxes that should be paid if the segments of 
the firm were separate.  
 
2.2 Finance constraints, diversification and corporate investment 
 
In their seminal work Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) try to address 
thoroughly the relationship between conventional models of investment and capital 
market imperfections referring to the access of individual firms to capital markets. 
Regarding mature firms with well-known prospects and capacities, conventional 
representative firm models in which financial framework appears not to be relevant 
to the investment decision may well be applied. Yet, for the rest of the firms, 
financial factors seem to be extremely relevant because external funds are not a 
perfect substitute for internal funds, especially when referring to the short run. On 
one hand when the cost disadvantage of external finance is small, withholding 
practices will display little or nothing regarding investment. Thus, firms will use 
external funds to support investment. On the other hand, when the cost disadvantage 
is major, firms which tend to invest more of their income may possibly have no low-
cost sources of investment finance. Therefore, their investment will be affected by 
the fluctuations of cash flow.  
 
Diversified firms are more efficient in allocating liquidity because they create a 
larger internal capital market. An alternative version of this argument belongs to 
Stulz (1990) who argues that the creation of larger capital markets from diversified 
firms leads to the reduction of under-investment problem that was also described 
earlier by Myers (1977). These internal capital market theories foresee that 
diversified firms overall make more positive net present value investments than they 
would as separate isolated segments. Additionally, Lang and Stulz (1994) show that 
Tobin’s Q and firm diversification are negatively correlated, and consequently 
diversified firms tend to display lower Tobin’s Q values compared to non-diversified 
firms. 
 
Financial constraints in capital markets can underline the macroeconomic effect of 
fluctuations in investment to cash flow and liquidity which has as a result several 
firms to reduce their access to low-cost finance. In order to examine this aspect in 
detail, Fazzari et al. (1988) try to determine the magnitude of the effects of internal 
finance on investment. Most of the literature regarding the effects of tax policy on 
investment supposes that firms respond to prices set changes in securities markets, 
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like market interest rates and Tobin’s Q, and that the availability of finance tend not 
to reduce investment (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Bower; 1970; Cummins et al., 
1994; Hassett and Hubbard, 2002). Therefore, the consequences for tax policy 
presuppose that marginal tax rate on returns for a new project is what really matters 
for investment. On the contrary, the firm’s average tax load on returns from its 
investments does not play such an important role. However, regarding firms which 
turn to imperfect markets for external financing, not only cost of funds it is 
significant. For these firms, the proportion of earnings which is destined for taxes is 
significant for investment. Thus, the effects of cash flow on investment tax credit or 
depreciation may be of greater importance for several firms than the relative effects 
of cost of capital of such policies (Fazzari et al., 1989).  
 
The fact that tax rates are important for some firms, does not mean that there exists a 
policy opportunity. Additionally, agency issues remain an area of serious discussion. 
Policies that increase internal finance may drive managers to over-invest. However, 
the comprehension of the effects of public policies on investment through the 
procedure of internal financing can be relevant and important. An extension for 
further research regarding the financial influences on investment and information 
imperfections in capital markets implies that the examination of the accumulated 
information capital through financial intermediation is extremely significant in order 
to understand the process of investment decision making. 
 
Financing constraints as well as corporate structure, liquidity and investment were 
also examined by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991). They try to explore the 
empirical relationship between investment and corporate financial structure. Their 
analysis is based on the large theoretical literature which displays that information 
problems in the capital market can affect financial structure and investment. They 
focus and find evidence on the fact that liquidity as availability of internal funds 
could constitute a significant determinant of investment.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample and data 
 
The unique sample of Greek non-financial firms listed in the ASE was tested in 
order to produce useful results. These results may be extremely important for 
managers of Greek companies in order to overcome the difficulties they face. The 
narrow bounds for investment and rising of firms, the general financial crisis of 
public as well as private sectors, make the role of Greek managers much more 
difficult. Therefore, the firm sample is multi-faceted. It consists of firms from 11 
different industries and sectors in order to incorporate the whole substance of 
optimism. The process is to exclude financial firms due to the differences in the way 
they compile their annual reports. Thus, the 184 non-financial sample firms will be 
the starting point for the research, in order to produce significant results and add to 
the existing knowledge on this subject. 
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Data is gathered from the stock market as well as from balance sheets and cash flow 
statements for all firms of the sample. Focus is placed on every firm’s annual report 
in order to gather all necessary data for the methodology. The next step is to classify 
stock prices on an everyday basis for all firms for the years from 2007 to 2012. Data 
is accessed from the ASE and is accumulated for every sample firm. Balance sheet 
data is necessary in order to formulate the basic variables that will be used in 
regression analysis. Balance sheet data is gathered from the web pages of all firms 
and is accumulated on an annual basis.  
  
Basic regressions are run from 2005 to 2012 in order to have an analysis of the 
effects of managerial optimism on subsequent corporate investment, aiming to see if 
there is something special about the period of interest in terms of investing 
conditions. The main data source for stock price data is the ASE. ASE is the primary 
data source of studies that analyse corporate decisions in Greece. 
 
Directors’ dealings data is obtained from Directors Deals – Global Data & Analysis, 
a specialised global data market company which analyses and monitors all share 
transactions made by directors in the shares of their own company. Therefore, this 
work uses all the available data regarding the Greek case for the period of 6 years 
(2007 to 2012). During this period a total of 18,575 directors’ dealings are reported. 
Because this study focuses on the transaction behaviour of individuals, all 
transactions that were executed by legal entities are excluded. The procedure is to 
maintain only the transactions that are described as buys or sells and exclude awards, 
contract buys, transfer ins and outs, transfers, div re, exercise, sale-post exercise, 
given away and subscribe.  
 
3.2 Determinants of the excess value  
 
The regression methodology involves running several regressions in order to 
examine whether managerial optimism is associated with inefficiencies which can 
lead to low market valuation of firms. The choice is to use excess value on a 
focused-firm “dummy” indicator as a dependent variable on several control variables 
as Berger and Ofek (1995) propose. Excess value of a company is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed 
value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments, with each segment’s imputed 
value being equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry median ratio of 
total capital (market value of equity plus book value of debt) to sales. More 
analytically, excess value EVi and imputed value I(V)i of a company i, are defined 
as: 
EVi , and                                                                                 (1) 
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I(V)i =                             (2) 
 
V = total capital (market value of equity plus book value of debt) 
Multiple of segment j of firm i = median ratio of V to accounting item (sales ratio) 
of focused firms in industry of segment j 
AIij = accounting item of segment j of firm i 
n = number of segments of firm i 
 
The independent variables are the natural logarithm of total assets, capital 
expenditures divided by sales, EBIT divided by sales, and managerial optimism 
“dummy” variable. The process was to first run a pooled OLS regression without the 
use of managerial optimism for the whole sample of the firms without separating the 
regressions accordingly to the three groups of managers (ALL, EB, and CEO). The 
pooled OLS regression model assumes that the coefficients are the same for all 
individuals.  
 
The dependent variable is excess value on a focused-firm indicator as it was 
calculated previously. The independent variables of the regression are the natural 
logarithm of total assets, capital expenditures divided by sales, and EBIT divided by 
sales. Therefore, the regression equation that arises has the next form: 
 
Y = b0 + b1X1 + b2X2+ b3X3+ ε                                                                   (3) 
 
Y = the values of the dependent variable (excess value on a focused-firm indicator) 
X1, X2, X3 = the values of the independent variables (the natural logarithm of total 
assets, capital expenditures divided by sales, and EBIT divided by sales) 
b0 = constant 
b1, b2, b3 = coefficients 
ε = the error term 
 
The next step is to run a series of fixed effects panel regressions. In regressions 4 to 
9 the managerial optimism “dummy” variable is incorporated. Since there are 
“dummy” variables in the model there are n-1 entities included. However, there is 
only one “dummy” variable. Therefore, the regression equation for fixed effects 
panel regressions remains unchanged, as in pooled OLS regression equation that was 
presented above. The “dummy” variable is equal to 1 when members of the 
Executive Board and the Supervisory Board (ALL), only the Executive Board (EB), 
or only CEO are classified as optimistic in a given year. The managerial optimism 
“dummy” variable takes lagged values in the last three fixed effects panel 
regressions of the study for the determinants of excess value. These lagged values 
are also incorporated separately in order to compare the possible changes in last 
year’s and current year’s values.  
 
4. Empirical Findings 
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4.1 Managerial optimism and the determinants of excess value 
Based on Glaser et al. (2008) this subsection demonstrates the possibility of the 
existence of a connection between managerial optimism and inefficiencies which 
leads to lower market valuation of firms. The main instrument is first a Pooled OLS 
regression. This regression model is chosen since there are panel data (both time 
series and cross section). All the data are put together, without making any 
distinction between cross section and time series. Therefore, running a regression 
over all the data using ordinary least squares, it leads to the use of Pooled OLS 
regression. It is the easiest to run and it is often used as simple benchmark to which 
more stilted regressions can be compared. 
 
The dependent variable is excess value. According to Berger and Ofek (1995) the 
excess value of a firm is the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to 
its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its 
segments, with each segment’s imputed value being equal to the segment’s sales 
multiplied by its industry median ratio of total capital (market value of equity plus 
book value of debt) to sales. The actual value of a firm includes all aspects of the 
business in terms of both tangible and intangible assets (Table 1). 
 
In regressions 2 and 3 the same regression is run first without the use of fixed effects 
and second with the use of year fixed effects. The observation made is that the 
indicators of profitability and firm size are significantly correlated to the excess 
value of the firm either with the use or not of the year fixed effects. The difference 
exists regarding the growth opportunities indicator, the ratio of EBIT to sales. 
Although its coefficient estimate remains at the same levels, there is no statistical 
significance between the control variable and excess value when fixed effects are 
run.  
 
The next six regressions (4 to 9) present results when managerial optimism variable 
is controlled for with lagged values (regressions 7 to 9) or not (regressions 4 to 6) 
with the use of fixed effects. The results are similar with those presented in Berger 
and Ofek (1995) and Glaser and Muller (2010). Table 1 shows that the existence of 
diversification itself does not seem to be the reason for the diversification discount 
and the lower excess value of the firm. Also consistent with Villalonga (2004a; 
2004b) this work finds that on average, diversification does not destroy the excess 
value of a firm.  
 
Another observation is that there exists a negative statistically significant correlation 
between managerial optimism and excess value. The higher the managerial 
optimism, the lower the excess value. This result is in line with Glaser et al. (2008) 
and is found to be robust across all optimism measures. However, this result is not 
consistent with insider trading based on private information since managers are 
likely not to be correct with their expectations regarding their firm’s performance. 
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As opposed to Glaser et al. (2008) the observation here is that lagged optimism 
variables maintain their statistical significance at either 1 per cent (ALL) or 5 per 
cent (EB and CEO). In line with Glaser et al. (2008) the stronger results with the 
highest coefficient estimates are encountered for the group of ALL managers. There, 
exists the stronger negative statistically significant relationship between managerial 
optimism and excess value. 
 
To summarise the observation is that adjusted R-squared values of the models are 
stable and they explain almost 50 per cent of the outcomes of this model. Based on 
the related literature, low R-squared values are a common phenomenon and hence 
the values obtained in this work are accepted since the variables fit the expectations. 
Finally, it is important to underline the fact that in some firms’ managers are biased. 
Often, these biased managers make decisions which end up being harmful for their 
firms. The overall findings in this study show that over-investment due to 
managerial optimism may serve as one possible explanation for the observed low 
excess value of firms. Yet, consistent with Glaser et al. (2008) all optimism 
measures are highly negatively correlated with excess value only where the link 
between optimism and corporate investment seems to be less strong. Therefore, 
managerial biases are likely to affect other corporate decision making to the damage 
of the firm. 
 
Table 1 shows coefficient estimates from regressions of excess value on a focused-
firm indicator and control variables such as in Berger and Ofek (1995). Excess value 
is the natural logarithm of the ration of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. A 
firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments, with each 
segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry 
median ratio of capital to that accounting item. Control variables are the natural 
logarithm of total assets, capital expenditures divided by sales, and EBIT divided by 
sales. In regressions 4 to 6 we include our optimism “dummy” variables. In 
regressions 7 to 9 we include lagged values of our optimism “dummy” variables. 
Regression 1 shows a pooled OLS regression, regression 2 is a fixed effects panel 
regression without year fixed effects. Regressions 3 to 9 show fixed effects panel 
regression with year fixed effects. Time period is 2007-2012. Robust p-values are in 
parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1 per cent, ** indicates significance at 5 
per cent and * indicates significance at 10 per cent. 
 
Finally, a major difference is observed regarding the excess value of the sample 
firms. For highly constrained firms the excess value is significantly lower than for 
unconstrained firms. Negative values are observed for firms with high financial 
constraints compared to the positive values of firms with low and middle financial 
constraints. This can be explained in the way that the excess value of a firm is a 
combination of sales, capital, and actual value of a firm. Since, these variables are 
significantly lower for highly constrained firms, the excess value of these firms 
evidently will record negative scores.  
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Table 1. Determinants of the excess value 
 
 
This table shows coefficient estimates from regressions of excess value on a focused-firm indicator and control variables such as in Berger and Ofek (1995). Excess value is the natural logarithm of the ration of a firm’s actual value to its 
imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments, with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to that accounting item. Control 
variables are the natural logarithm of total assets, capital expenditures divided by sales, and EBIT divided by sales. In regressions 4 to 6 we include our optimism “dummy” variables. In regressions 7 to 9 we include lagged values of our 
optimism “dummy” variables. Regression 1 shows a pooled OLS regression, regression 2 is a fixed effects panel regression without year fixed effects. Regressions 3 to 9 show fixed effects panel regression with year fixed effects. Time 
period is 2007-2012. Robust p-values are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1 per cent, ** indicates significance at 5 per cent and * indicates significance at 10 per cen
 Optimism based on       All EB CEO All (Lagged) EB (Lagged) CEO (Lagged) 
 Type of regression Pooled OLS FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Focused firm 
0.748 0.054 0.055 0.051 0.054 0.055 0.055 0.045 0.051 
(0.000***) (0.360) (0.328) (0.421) (0.285) (0.321) (0.323) (0.331) (0.340) 
Ln (total asset) 
0.101 0.146 0.155 0.153 0.156 0.174 0.148 0.144 0.162 
(0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) 
CAPEX/sales 
0.003 0.590 0.359 0.382 0.390 0.631 0.207 0.001 0.001 
(0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.001***) 0.230 0.244 
EBIT/sales 
0.058 0.052 0.060 0.005 0.005 -0.003 0.096 0.013 0.038 
(0.002***) (0.099*) 0.120 0.122 0.118 (0.089*) (0.060*) 0.437 0.164 
Managerial optimism 
      -0.047 -0.039 -0.031 -0.083 -0.022 -0.058 
      (0.003***) (0.009***) (0.016**) (0.003***) (0.016**) (0.013**) 
Constant 
-0.143 -0.225 -0.260 -0.224 -0.232 -0.234 -0.230 -0.238 -0.240 
(0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) 
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cases 1799 1799 1799 1799 1799 1799 1754 1754 1754 
Firms 328 327 332 330 299 296 320 299 294 
Adjusted R-squared 0.321  0.447 0.448 0.447 0.446 0.447 0.447 0.450 0.447 
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The interesting point of this analysis is regarding the excess value of the firms being 
analysed in the sample. Excess value for Whited-Wu-index (Whited and Wu, 2006) 
is the only descriptive statistic of the constraint terciles that does not exceed the 
excess value calculated by the Kaplan-Zingales-index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). 
This may be explained possibly because the Whited-Wu-index (Whited and Wu, 
2006) is more affected by the low value of sales growth and industry sales growth. 
However, excess value still displays significantly lower values for financially 
constrained firms of the sample.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Over-investment is correlated to lower value for diversified firms, as well as the 
isolated segments of a diversified firm tend to over-invest more than focused firms. 
Their study is consistent with the evidence on the loss of value in firms which 
followed a diversification program during the 1980s. If over-investment as well as 
cross-subsidisation is correctly controlled, diversification is more likely to produce 
small benefits in regard to the higher debt capacity and tax savings.  
 
Consistent with the results of Glaser et al. (2008) this work has also confirmed 
Research Question 2 too. Financially constrained firms compared to the whole 
sample of firms did not display high investment-cash flow sensitivities. Constrained 
firms when there are favourable investing opportunities, have the tendency to invest 
more. They tend to issue more debt in order to be able to finance these advantageous 
investing opportunities. Moreover, there was no strong evidence regarding optimism 
and CEOs’ transactions. This work’s findings did not justify the fact that a CEO 
plays a significant role in corporate firm performance. On the contrary, Glaser et al. 
(2008) have underlined that CEOs play a significant role in corporate decision 
making and consequently on firm performance although not only them are 
responsible for the performance of a firm. Glaser et al. (2008) have found that 
Supervisory Board members too along with the Executive Board members may play 
an important role regarding a firm’s corporate decision-making policies and 
performance.  
 
Therefore, in financially constrained firms, the investment-cash flow sensitivity with 
optimistic managers was more noticeable. The fact that a firm is financially 
constrained implies that optimistic managers affect cash flow of investment at a 
higher level than managers who are not optimistic. Again, optimism as a managerial 
cognitive characteristic played an important role in corporate investment decision 
making. This result confirms Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999), Cleary 
(2006), Glaser and Hirn (2007) and Glaser et al. (2008). 
 
Finally, consistent with the results of Berger and Ofek (1995), Glaser and Muller 
(2007) and Glaser et al. (2008) this work investigated the impact of diversification 
and managerial optimism on the excess value of a firm too. First of all, it was found 
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that the existence of diversification did not seem to rationalise the phenomenon of 
diversification discount and the lower excess value of the firm. Instead, managerial 
optimism significantly affected the excess value of the firm. More specifically, the 
higher the managerial optimism the lower the excess value of the firm. This can be 
justified because possible over-investment due to the existence of managerial 
optimism may constitute an explanation for the low excess value of firms. 
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